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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
                      
 
 
STAPLETON, Circuit Judge: 
 
 The Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA"), 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 1346(b), 2671-2680, waives the federal government's sovereign 
immunity with respect to tort claims for money damages.  The 
"discretionary function exception" to the FTCA limits that 
waiver, stating that the government retains sovereign immunity 
with respect to "[a]ny claim . . . based upon the exercise or 
performance [of,] or the failure to exercise or perform[,] a 
discretionary function or duty . . . , whether or not the 
discretion involved be abused."  28 U.S.C. § 2680(a).  The 
appeals now before the court in banc require us to examine the 
scope of the discretionary function exception.   
 The plaintiffs in these cases were injured by several 
policy decisions made by the Commissioner of the Food and Drug 
Administration ("FDA") while exercising a discretionary function.  
They seek to avoid the legal consequences that would flow from 
application of the discretionary function exception to their 
cases by (1) looking behind the Commissioner's injury-causing 
decision, (2) finding fault with an aspect of the data upon which 
it may have been based, and (3) arguing that their claims are not 
"based upon" the Commissioner's decisions but instead are "based 
upon" the alleged negligence of various laboratory technicians 
who supplied the allegedly faulty data to the Commissioner.  We 
  
reject this attempt to circumvent the discretionary function 
exception, concluding that if the discretionary function 
exception to the FTCA is to fulfill its clear and important 
purpose, a claim must be "based upon" the exercise of a 
discretionary function whenever the immediate cause of the 
plaintiff's injury is a decision which is susceptible of policy 
analysis and which is made by an official legally authorized to 
make it.  Because the plaintiffs' claims are based upon  
decisions susceptible of policy analysis and made by an official 
of the executive branch acting within his authority, we will 
affirm the district court's order dismissing these cases for lack 
of subject-matter jurisdiction.   
 For the purpose of our analysis, we have assumed the 
facts alleged by the plaintiffs to be true.  Berkovitz v. United 
States, 486 U.S. 531, 540 (1988).  Our "scope of review of the 
applicability of the discretionary function exception is 
plenary."  United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. United States, 
837 F.2d 116, 119 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1235 (1988). 
 
 I. 
 On March 2, 1989, an anonymous caller to the United 
States Embassy in Santiago, Chile, stated that Chilean fruit 
bound for the United States would be injected with cyanide.  The 
FDA took the lead agency role in evaluating the seriousness of 
the call, and it detained all incoming Chilean fruit over the 
weekend of March 4 and 5 while it undertook an investigation.  On 
March 6, having found no evidence that any Chilean fruit had 
  
actually been poisoned, the FDA announced that it considered the 
call a hoax.  It nevertheless continued to conduct experiments 
concerning the effects that cyanide injections would have on 
various Chilean fruits. 
 The embassy in Santiago then received a second 
anonymous call.  This time the warnings were more specific.  The 
caller indicated that he had access to orchards, storage 
facilities, and shipping locations in Chile, and stated that 
unidentified fruit had already been injected with cyanide.  This 
prompted the FDA's Philadelphia District Office to double the 
inspection level of incoming Chilean fruit, beginning with that 
arriving on the "Almeria Star."  The Philadelphia District Office 
designated that certain portions of the Almeria Star's cargo 
would be examined, and any fruit that looked "suspect" was to be 
sent to the Philadelphia District Office for testing. 
 The increased level of inspection soon yielded results.  
On the morning of March 12, an FDA inspector discovered two 
grapes from the Almeria Star which appeared to have been 
punctured, and which displayed uniform white rings.  Further 
examination of the crate containing these suspect grapes revealed 
a third white-ringed grape, which, unlike the others, appeared to 
have been slit rather than punctured.  Although the physical 
appearance of these grapes was inconsistent with that of grapes 
injected with cyanide during FDA experimentation, the FDA 
officials as a precautionary measure sent the grapes, as well as 
the crate in which they were packaged, to the FDA's Philadelphia 
laboratory for testing. 
  
 The Philadelphia laboratory began testing the grapes 
for cyanide in the early afternoon of March 12.  The FDA 
technicians used all of the two punctured grapes in conducting 
their tests, but saved the third, slit, grape for confirmation 
purposes.  The testing process required the grapes to be mashed 
until they turned into a solution.  Sulfuric acid was then added 
to this slurry, causing a chemical reaction that released in 
gaseous form any cyanide that was present in the solution.  The 
gas released from the solution was twice exposed to cyanide-
sensitive strips of reactive paper, both of which indicated the 
presence of cyanide.  A third test then confirmed a high 
concentration of cyanide present in the slurry.  At approximately 
9:30 p.m. on March 12, the Philadelphia laboratory orally 
reported positive cyanide test results from the solution to the 
FDA's Emergency Operations Center. 
 Meanwhile, FDA officials transferred a portion of the 
slurry, along with the third, slit, grape and the bunch in which 
these grapes had been found, to the FDA's Cincinnati laboratory.  
Technicians there identified two additional white-ringed grapes 
on the bunch, but were unable to confirm the presence of cyanide.  
The Philadelphia laboratory also continued testing other grapes 
from the suspect crate, as well as all packing materials in that 
crate.  These further tests also failed to reveal the presence of 
cyanide. 
 The Commissioner was supplied with the findings of the 
Philadelphia and Cincinnati laboratories in the early morning 
hours of March 13.  The information before him at that point was 
  
that three tests conducted on two of the suspect grapes indicated 
the presence of cyanide.  The retesting of the slurry and the 
testing of the third "reserved" grape, the other grapes, and the 
packaging, however, did not confirm the presence of cyanide.  He 
also knew of the reports to the embassy in Santiago and the 
surveillance activity that had already been conducted.  On the 
basis of this information, the Commissioner on March 13 issued an 
order refusing entry of any additional Chilean fruit into the 
United States and requiring the withdrawal and destruction of all 
Chilean fruit then in domestic channels of distribution.  The FDA 
also issued a press release publicizing the Philadelphia 
laboratory's finding of cyanide in two Chilean grapes and the 
order refusing the entry of Chilean fruit into the United States.  
Consumers were encouraged to destroy any Chilean fruit in their 
possession, and grocers were instructed to remove all Chilean 
fruit from their shelves. 
 The plaintiffs in these cases are (1) approximately 
2400 Chilean growers and exporters of fresh fruit, (2) a Chilean 
shipping line, (3) three United States firms that are engaged in 
the importation and distribution of fresh produce, and (4) a non-
certified class whose named plaintiff is a Chilean fruit grower.  
They seek damages from the United States government under the 
FTCA, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b), on a negligence theory, contending 
that the technicians in the FDA's Philadelphia laboratory were 
negligent in failing to reserve any portion of the two punctured 
grapes for later confirmation testing.  Plaintiffs claim that 
this violated both the FDA's Regulatory Procedures Manual and 
  
good laboratory practices generally.  As a result, the Cincinnati 
laboratory was unable to verify the positive result reported by 
the Philadelphia laboratory.  Plaintiffs further allege that the 
lab technicians were negligent in failing to record their 
observations contemporaneously with their testing, thereby 
casting doubt on the accuracy of their results and the content of 
the oral report, and in failing to take account of the known 
properties of cyanide in fruit.  According to the complaint, but 
for this negligence, the Commissioner would not have issued his 
orders and the Chilean fruit business for the spring season of 
1989 would not have been destroyed.  
 The United States moved to dismiss, arguing that the 
district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over 
plaintiffs' claims.  The district court granted that motion, 
reasoning that the discretionary function exception to the FTCA 
shielded the government's conduct from liability.  The plaintiffs 
appeal. 
 
 II. 
 A. 
 The Federal Tort Claims Act gives district courts 
jurisdiction over: 
 civil actions on claims against the United 
States, for money damages, accruing on and 
after January 1, 1945, for injury or loss of 
property, or personal injury or death caused 
by the negligent or wrongful act or omission 
of any employee of the Government while 
acting within the scope of his office or 
employment, under circumstances where the 
United States, if a private person, would be 
  
liable to the claimant in accordance with the 
law of the place where the act or omission 
occurred. 
28 U.S.C. § 1346(b).  The FTCA thus waives the government's 
sovereign immunity with respect to tort claims against the United 
States for money damages. 
 This waiver of the government's immunity is subject to 
certain exceptions, however, one of which is the discretionary 
function exception.  28 U.S.C. § 2680(a).  As we have noted, that 
exception dictates that the waiver "shall not apply to . . . 
[a]ny claim . . . based upon the exercise or performance or the 
failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty 
on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the Government, 
whether or not the discretion involved be abused."     
 The discretionary function exception is designed to 
protect policy making by the politically accountable branches of 
government from interference in the form of "second-guessing" by 
the judiciary -- second guessing the result of which burdens the 
public fisc and the prospect of which skews the decisionmaking 
process of executive and legislative policymakers.  United States 
v. S.A. Empresa De Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig Airlines), 
467 U.S. 797, 808 (1984).  As the Court explained in Varig 
Airlines: 
 [W]hatever else the discretionary function 
exception may include, it plainly was 
intended to encompass the discretionary acts 
of the Government acting in its role as a 
regulator of the conduct of private 
individuals.  Time and again the legislative 
history refers to the acts of regulatory 
agencies as examples of those covered by the 
exception . . . .  This emphasis upon 
  
protection for regulatory activities suggests 
an underlying basis for the inclusion of an 
exception for discretionary functions in the 
Act:  Congress wished to prevent judicial 
"second-guessing" of legislative and 
administrative decisions grounded in social, 
economic, and political policy through the 
medium of an action in tort. 
 
Id. at 814 (footnote omitted).  Thus, the discretionary function 
exception is a product of Congress' recognition that "the 
imposition of liability for damages occasioned by governmental 
policymaking would necessarily involve a very substantial, if not 
prohibitive, social cost not only in terms of the imposed 
liability itself, but also in terms of the constraining effect of 
that liability on the decisions of governmental policymakers."  
Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. United States, 919 F.2d 888, 890 (3d Cir. 
1990), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 941 (1991). 
 Whether the discretionary function exception applies 
involves a two-pronged inquiry.  "[A] court must first consider 
whether the action is a matter of choice for the acting 
employee."  Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 536.  Second, the court must 
determine whether the element of judgment involved "is of the 
kind that the discretionary function exception was designed to 
shield."  Id.  Under this second prong, the court must determine 
whether the challenged discretionary actions or decisions were 
"based on considerations of public policy."  Id. at 537.  "The 
focus of the inquiry is not on the agent's subjective intent in 
exercising the discretion conferred by statute or regulation, but 
on the nature of the actions taken and on whether they are 
  
susceptible to policy analysis."  United States v. Gaubert, 499 
U.S. 315, 325 (1991). 
 
 B. 
 The district court, applying these principles to the 
Commissioner's decisions to deny entry of Chilean fruit and to 
destroy Chilean fruit already in the United States, found that 
the decisions were policy decisions protected by the 
discretionary function exception to the FTCA.  We agree.  
Specifically, the district court concluded: 
 The FDA acted to protect the public from the 
risk of exposure to poisonous fruit which it 
learned could be coming from Chile.  It had 
the discretion to test the fruit and 
determine whether the fruit was adulterated.  
It also had the discretion to refuse entry 
into the United States.  The actions taken 
were not violative of any regulatory or 
statutory provisions.  The acts taken were in 
accordance with the FDA's authority to 
determine whether or not a specific product 
should be allowed entrance into the United 
States.  This conduct is grounded in the 
policy of protecting the public health.  The 
actions were clearly in furtherance of the 
FDA's statutory mission to protect the 
American public from adulterated food.  All 
the acts involved judgment and choice and 
were grounded in policy. 
Balmaceda v. United States, 815 F. Supp. 823, 827 (E.D. Pa. 
1992). 
 As the district court found, the Commissioner's 
decisions were clearly "matter[s] of choice" for a person 
occupying his position.  As the plaintiffs readily concede, the 
orders giving rise to these cases were authorized both in the 
  
sense that the Commissioner was acting within the scope of his 
authority1 and in the sense that his orders were not in conflict 
with any applicable statute or regulation.  In short, the 
Commissioner was the public official responsible for making these 
choices and he made them in a lawful manner.  Accordingly, we 
turn to the second prong of a discretionary function exception 
analysis and consider whether the choices to be made were 
susceptible to policy analysis. 
 In making his decisions, the Commissioner was required 
to evaluate and reconcile in some manner the findings of the 
Philadelphia and Cincinnati laboratories.  Among other things, 
this would include making a judgment about the significance of 
the fact that no segment of the first two grapes had been 
reserved for confirmatory testing.  Moreover, the significance of 
this data had to be judged in the overall context of the reports 
to the embassy in Santiago, the surveillance activity that had 
                     
1
.  The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-
394, provides that the Commissioner of the FDA may "cause to be 
disseminated information regarding food, drugs, devices, or 
cosmetics in situations involving, in the opinion of the 
[Commissioner], imminent danger to the health or gross deception 
of the consumer."  21 U.S.C. § 375(b); see also 21 C.F.R. § 
2.5(a).  FDA regulations also permit the Commissioner of the FDA 
to initiate a "recall" of food in distribution channels where the 
food presents a risk of injury to consumers and recall is needed 
to protect the public health.  21 C.F.R. § 7.45; see 21 C.F.R. §§ 
7.40-7.59.  Whether and when to initiate a recall in any 
particular case is a judgment call for appropriate FDA officials 
to make in light of the perceived "urgen[cy]" of the situation.  
21 C.F.R. § 7.40(b).  Thus, whether recall is warranted is 
assessed in light of "the degree of seriousness of the health 
hazard" and "the likelihood of occurrence of the hazard."  21 
C.F.R. § 7.41(a)(4),(5). 
  
already been conducted, the probability that contaminated grapes, 
if they existed, would be consumed, and probable consequences of 
any such consumption to the person poisoned, fruit consumers in 
general, and to the fruit industry as a whole. 
 A critical part of the policymaking process was the 
Commissioner's decision to make a decision in the early morning 
hours of March 13, rather than to await more surveillance and 
testing.  If he had waited, the plaintiffs might not have 
suffered the injury of which they complain.  Of course, the 
Commissioner did not wait and, unfortunately, that injury did 
occur.  The point, however, is that the decision about when the 
data were sufficient to permit responsible decisionmaking 
involved questions of "social, economic, and political policy."  
Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. at 814.  That decision was an inherent 
part of the policymaking process and just as susceptible of being 
skewed by the prospect of judicial second guessing as any other 
part of the process.  Thus, the Commissioner's decisions both 
involved an element of judgment or choice, and were the kind of 
choices "that the discretionary function exception was designed 
to shield."  Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 536. 
 
  
  C. 
 The plaintiffs attempt to avoid application of the 
discretionary function exception by looking behind the injury-
causing decision and finding fault with an aspect of the data on 
which it may have been based.  The gist of their complaint is 
that the FDA's Philadelphia laboratory's tests were negligently 
performed because the procedures used conformed neither to the 
FDA's Regulatory Procedures Manual nor to good laboratory 
practices generally.  Thus, the plaintiffs claim, their complaint 
is "based on" the behavior of the laboratory technicians and not 
on the FDA Commissioner's decisions to bar fruit from Chile and 
to remove it from the marketplace.  The methods employed by the 
laboratory technicians while testing the grapes, they argue 
further, did not involve "the permissible exercise of policy 
judgment," Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 537, and accordingly were not 
themselves protected by the discretionary function exception. 
 We acknowledge that simply as a matter of semantics, it 
is possible to characterize the plaintiffs' claims as being 
"based upon" the conduct of the Philadelphia laboratory 
technicians.  We nevertheless reject that proposed 
characterization because it is inconsistent with the purpose of 
the discretionary function exception. 
 The plaintiffs emphasize that this case comes to us on 
a grant of a motion to dismiss, and that we must accept their 
version of the facts as true.  This is, of course, an accurate 
statement of the law.  But the fact that we must accept the 
plaintiffs' version of the facts as true does not mean that we 
  
must accept plaintiffs' characterization of those facts.  We know 
of no authority for the proposition that plaintiffs, by the 
manner in which they draft their complaints, may dictate that 
their claims are "based upon" one government employee's actions 
and not another's.  The relevant authority is to the contrary.  
Cf. United States v. Neustadt, 366 U.S. 696, 703-06 & n.13 (1961) 
(holding that federal law, not state law or the language of 
plaintiff's complaint, governs the applicability of 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2680(h)'s retention of sovereign immunity in cases where the 
plaintiff's claim "arise[s] out of . . . misrepresentation"); 
Kosak v. United States, 465 U.S. 848, 851-62 (1984) (whether 
plaintiff's claim "aros[e] in respect of . . . the detention of 
any goods or merchandise by any officer of customs" for the 
purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2680(c) is an independent question of 
federal law the resolution of which depends on the terms and 
purposes of the FTCA).   
 The reality here is that the injuries of which the 
plaintiffs complain were caused by the Commissioner's decisions 
and, as a matter of law, their claims are therefore "based upon" 
those decisions.  Any other view would defeat the purpose of the 
discretionary function exception.  In situations like this where 
the injury complained of is caused by a regulatory policy 
decision, the fact of the matter is that there is no difference 
in the quality or quantity of the interference occasioned by 
judicial second guessing, whether the plaintiff purports to be 
attacking the data base on which the policy is founded or 
  
acknowledges outright that he or she is challenging the policy 
itself. 
 If plaintiffs injured by regulatory policy decisions 
were permitted to prosecute damage actions by challenging the 
manner in which the underlying data was collected, federal 
courts, of necessity, would be required to examine in detail the 
decisionmaking process of the policy maker to determine what role 
the challenged data played in the policymaking and what the 
policymaker's decision would have been if he or she had received 
the unchallenged data but not the challenged data (or had 
received other data in lieu of the challenged data).  Without 
such an examination and all of the discovery that would 
necessarily precede it, a plaintiff in the position of these 
plaintiffs would be unable to prove a causal link between the 
alleged negligence and the alleged injury.  Yet this is precisely 
the kind of inquiry that the Supreme Court sought to foreclose 
when it ruled out any inquiry into an official's "subjective 
intent in exercising the discretion conferred by statute or 
regulation."  Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 325.  
 The social cost of permitting the inquiries required by 
the plaintiffs' theory are prohibitive.  First, because the 
liability-creating decision might be a policy choice at the very 
highest level of a regulatory agency, the number of persons 
affected by the decision is potentially staggering and the 
potential liability virtually unlimited.  Second, because of the 
nature of the inquiry, the demands of the litigation process on 
  
the most valuable human resources of the regulatory agency will 
be extraordinary.  But this is only a part of the picture.   
 As we have earlier suggested, every policy decision 
involves an exercise of the policymaker's judgment about the 
reliability, adequacy, and significance of the information 
available to him or her.  Because of time and expense constraints 
and because experience teaches that human beings make mistakes in 
technique, perception, logic, communication, and a myriad of 
other areas, no decisionmaker can have one hundred percent 
confidence in the information before him or her at any given 
point in time.  Each responsible decision therefore necessarily 
reflects the decisionmaker's judgment that it is more desirable 
to make a decision based on the currently available information 
than to wait for more complete data or more confirmation of the 
existing data. 
 When one appreciates that virtually all policymaking 
involves judgments about the reliability of the available data, 
it is not difficult to predict the impact upon policymakers that 
would result from the fear of virtually unlimited liability and 
the prospect of virtually interminable litigation associated with 
the plaintiffs' theory of liability.  The "safest" course from 
the decisionmaker's personal perspective will be to wait for more 
conclusive data.  But that course can carry a very high social 
cost.  This is graphically illustrated by asking what will happen 
the next time a Commissioner of the FDA has to make decisions 
like those here involved if the current Commissioner is exposed 
to this litigation and the United States government is found 
  
liable for all the losses here alleged.  We believe the 
discretionary function exception was intended to make sure every 
Commissioner's judgment will not be skewed by such 
considerations. 
 
 D. 
 The plaintiffs rely principally on two Supreme Court 
decisions:  Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531 (1988), and 
Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61 (1955).  In 
Berkovitz, the plaintiff had contracted polio from a dose of 
polio vaccine.  The decisions alleged to have caused the 
plaintiff's injury were a decision to license the manufacture of 
the lot from which that plaintiff's dose of vaccine came and the 
decision to release that lot for use by the public.  The Supreme 
Court held that the discretionary function exception would not 
protect those decisions if they were contrary to a previously-
established policy which left no discretion to the 
decisionmakers.  Thus, where the policy previously established by 
statute and regulation deprived the agency of the authority to 
license a manufacturer without insisting that it submit specified 
data to the agency, a decision to license without requiring that 
submission was not a protected exercise of a discretionary 
function.  Similarly, if a previously determined policy 
established objective scientific criteria for release of a lot 
and deprived the agency of discretion to release a lot not 
meeting those standards, damage liability could be imposed for a 
decision to release a lot not meeting those criteria. 
  
 The cases before us, unlike Berkovitz, are not cases in 
which the injury-causing decision was contrary to a previously 
established policy which deprived the decisionmaker of 
discretion.  The policy previously established by Congress and 
the FDA called for the Commissioner to make a discretionary 
decision on whether the public health required a quarantine of 
Chilean fruit.  The plaintiffs have pointed to no statute or 
regulation that the Commissioner's decision violated.  The best 
they can do is reach behind the Commissioner's decision and point 
to a laboratory manual that allegedly called for the retention of 
a portion of the first two perforated, white-ringed grapes.  But 
clearly the laboratory manual was not intended to deprive the 
Commissioner of the discretion to make the decision that he made 
on March 13 based on the information available to him at the 
time. 
 In Indian Towing, the plaintiff had been injured as a 
result of the negligent operation of a lighthouse by the Coast 
Guard.  The Court held that although the Coast Guard had no 
obligation to undertake lighthouse service, once it exercised its 
discretion to do so, it was obliged to exercise due care.  The 
Court has recently described the basis for decision in Indian 
Towing as follows: 
 The United States was held liable . . . 
because making sure the light was operational 
"did not involve any permissible exercise of 
policy judgment."  . . .  Indeed, the 
Government did not even claim the benefit of 
the exception but unsuccessfully urged that 
maintaining the light was a governmental 
function for which it could not be liable.  
 
  
United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 326. 
 
 The plaintiffs argue that just as the government, after 
making the discretionary decision to provide lighthouse services, 
could not thereafter provide those services negligently, so too 
the government here, after making a discretionary decision to 
test incoming Chilean fruit, could not thereafter fail to 
exercise care in doing the testing.  Besides the fact that the 
discretionary function exception was not at issue in Indian 
Towing, the plaintiffs miss the critical distinction between that 
case and this.  The plaintiff in Indian Towing was injured by the 
negligently performed lighthouse services and his case 
accordingly required an inquiry only into how those services were 
delivered, not into the exercise of policymaking discretion.  
Here the plaintiffs would not have been injured but for the 
decisions of the Commissioner and litigation of their cases will 
require extensive inquiry into the process by which those 
decisions were made.  Once a policy decision has been made 
negligence in its non-discretionary execution can give rise to 
FTCA liability without jeopardizing the interests the 
discretionary function exception is designed to protect.  Those 
interests would be jeopardized, however, by allowing these 
plaintiffs to go forward.  Cf. Patterson v. United States, 881 
F.2d 127, 128 (4th Cir. 1989) (in banc) (holding that plaintiffs 
may not base claim on the non-discretionary action of an Office 
of Surface Mining ("OSM") inspector because that action was 
followed by a decision by the OSM not to take further action). 
  
 
 IV. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the order of 
the district court dismissing the complaints in these cases. 
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 I respectfully dissent from the conclusion reached by 
the majority.  I cannot accept cloaking a decision, which results 
from negligently performed laboratory work, with the 
discretionary function exception under circumstances in which the 
decision maker would expect, first, that the laboratory work will 
be performed under scientifically recognized and accepted 
techniques and, second, that further actions by the decision 
maker will be governed by the results of that testing.   
 Because I conclude that such circumstances have been 
alleged by the plaintiffs in their complaint, I find it improper 
for the district court to have dismissed the complaint on the 
basis of the discretionary function exception.  
 In ruling on defendants' motions to dismiss, the 
district court focused on the conduct of the FDA as a whole.  It 
  
conducted an analysis of the statutes and regulations governing 
the FDA, and concluded that 
 [u]nder this authorization, FDA had the discretion to 
act during the Chilean grape crisis.  The FDA acted to 
protect the public from the risk of exposure to 
poisonous fruit which it learned could be coming from 
Chile.  It had the discretion to test the fruit and 
determine whether the fruit was adulterated.  It also 
had the discretion to refuse entry into the United 
States.  The actions taken were not violative of any 
regulatory or statutory provisions.  The acts taken 
were in accordance with the FDA's authority to 
determine whether or not a specific product should be 
allowed entrance into the United States.  This conduct 
is grounded in the policy of protecting the public 
health.  The actions were clearly in furtherance of the 
FDA's statutory mission to protect the American public 
from adulterated food.  All the acts involved judgment 
and choice and were grounded in policy. 
Balmaceda v. United States, 815 F. Supp. 823, 827 (E.D. Pa. 
1992).  The district court declined to "consider alleged 
violations of a laboratory procedures manual because this 
argument simply is the basis of the plaintiffs' claim of 
negligence."  Id. at 826. 
 I believe, however, that, in analyzing the actions 
taken here by the FDA, one must consider carefully whether it is 
implicit in the order for tests to be performed that the tests 
are both scientifically accepted and reliable.  If it is 
implicit, I would not extend the discretionary function exception 
to actions which predictably follow from the test results.  The 
discretionary function exception should not protect an official's 
decisions, brought about by the results of accepted and reliable 
tests, just as it will not protect an official's release of a 
  
noncomplying lot of polio vaccine.  See Berkovitz by Berkovitz v. 
United States, 486 U.S. 531 (1988).   
 Moreover, if actions are taken as a result of accepted 
and reliable testing, they may no longer be the product of 
independent judgment.  The determination to order testing 
involved the element of choice.  However, it is not clear from 
the record before us whether any significant discretion to choose 
remained after the decision to test or whether a positive test 
result would implicate a concomitant decision to withdraw the 
fruit from the market.  If plaintiff can prove the existence of 
such inevitability, the discretionary function exception may no 
longer be implicated.  Accord Westfall v. Erwin, 484 U.S. 292, 
296-97 (1988) ("When an official's conduct is not the product of 
independent judgment, the threat of liability cannot 
detrimentally inhibit that conduct."). 
 I do not question the majority's conclusion that the 
Commissioner's action in ordering the testing was discretionary.  
I believe, however, that the majority's view of the case 
misapprehends the precise nature of plaintiffs' claims under the 
FTCA.  Plaintiffs do not argue that the initial decision to test 
was not a protected discretionary function.  What plaintiffs do 
argue is that the decision to withdraw Chilean fruit from the 
market was proximately caused by the positive test results.  
Plaintiffs contend that the tests performed by the FDA's 
Philadelphia laboratory were negligently performed in that the 
procedures used conformed neither to the FDA's Regulatory 
Procedures Manual nor to good laboratory practices.  Their 
  
complaints allege that, "as a result of the negligent analysis 
performed and reported by the Philadelphia laboratory, the FDA 
decided to take three actions: 1) refusing entry into the United 
States of all Chilean fruit; 2) forcing a market withdrawal of 
all Chilean fruit already in distribution channels; and 3) 
issuing a press release informing consumers to refrain from 
eating Chilean fruit."  Joint Appendix at 169.  Thus, plaintiffs 
do not challenge the FDA Commissioner's decisions to test fruit 
from Chile or, based upon properly performed testing, to take 
action to remove all Chilean fruit from the marketplace.     
 Because we are considering a motion to dismiss, we must 
accept as true all of the factual allegations in the complaints.  
Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 540, 108 S. Ct. at 1961.  For present 
purposes, there was no cyanide in the grapes, the FDA technicians 
were negligent in reaching the conclusion that there was cyanide 
contamination, and this negligence was the cause-in-fact and 
proximate cause of the damage to plaintiffs.  Moreover, there is 
no contention here that the actions of the laboratory 
technicians, in testing the grapes, involved the permissible 
exercise of policy judgment.  The technicians are not protected 
by the exception. 
 In Berkovitz, the Supreme Court stated that "the 
discretionary function exception will not apply when a federal 
statute, regulation, or policy specifically prescribes a course 
of action for an employee to follow.  In this event, the employee 
has no rightful option but to adhere to the directive."  Id. at 
536, 108 S. Ct. at 1958-59.  In this case, the plaintiffs allege 
  
that the Regulatory Procedures Manual established procedures to 
be followed for tests such as those performed at the Philadelphia 
lab and provided that any modification to those procedures be 
reduced to writing.  Plaintiffs contend that the lab technicians 
violated the manual's specific instructions in failing to reserve 
portions of the two punctured grapes for confirmatory testing and 
in failing to make contemporaneous records of their observations. 
 The majority speculates that, after receiving the test 
results, the Commissioner was required to make a judgment about 
the conflicting findings of the Philadelphia and Cincinnati 
laboratories and to judge the significance of the Philadelphia 
laboratory's failure to follow established procedures.  See page     
[typescript at 13-14].  These contentions, however, do not appear 
in the complaint.  In the record before the district court on the 
motion to dismiss, such speculation would be inappropriate.  
Plaintiffs' allegations do, however, permit the conclusion that 
the decision to withdraw Chilean fruit from the market followed 
as a result of the negligent testing.   
 I find that such an allegation satisfies the pleading 
requirements of Berkovitz.  Moreover, in Berkovitz, which 
concerned, inter alia, a claim that the Division of Biologic 
Standards (DBS) of the National Institutes of Health had 
wrongfully licensed the production of a polio vaccine, the Court 
made the following observation: 
  If petitioners' claim is that the DBS made a 
determination that [the vaccine] complied with 
regulatory standards, but that the determination was 
incorrect, ... the question turns on whether the manner 
and method of determining compliance with the safety 
  
standards at issue involve agency judgment of the kind 
protected by the discretionary function exception.  
Petitioners contend that the determination involves the 
application of objective scientific standards, ... 
whereas the Government asserts that the determination 
incorporates considerable "policy judgment" ... .  In 
making these assertions, the parties have framed the 
issue appropriately; application of the discretionary 
function exception to the claim that the determination 
of compliance was incorrect hinges on whether the 
agency officials making that determination permissibly 
exercise policy choice. 
Id. at 544-45, 108 S. Ct. at 1963 (footnote omitted).  As this 
passage makes clear, judgment guided purely by scientific or 
other objective principles does not involve discretion for 
purposes of the discretionary function exception.  See also 
Griffin v. United States, 500 F.2d 1059, 1066 (3d Cir. 1974) 
("Where the conduct of Government employees in implementing 
agency regulations requires only performance of scientific 
evaluation and not the formulation of policy, we do not believe 
that the conduct is immunized from judicial review as a 
'discretionary function.'"); Ayala v. United States, 980 F.2d 
1342, 1349-50 (10th Cir. 1992) ("We fail to see how the 
determination in this case can be labeled a policy decision.  The 
choice was governed, as plaintiffs contend, by 'objective 
principles of electrical engineering.'"). 
 In Berkovitz, the specifications for licensing vaccine 
or releasing lots of vaccine had been incorporated in procedures 
and regulations.  In the present case, the Commissioner did not 
have specific procedures established for handling fruit to 
determine if it had been contaminated.  Nevertheless, the 
plaintiffs allege that the technicians' sole purpose in testing 
  
the suspect grapes was to determine whether they had been 
injected with cyanide.  Appellants claim that the technicians 
were provided with precise, objective, scientific standards to 
use in the testing.  Any decisions made in the course of testing 
concerning what portions of the grapes to test or how to conduct 
the tests should have been made solely with reference to these 
principles of science.  I am not persuaded that this situation is 
significantly different from that in Berkovitz. 
 Social, economic, and political factors--those involved 
in the kinds of decisions Congress intended to shield from 
liability--had no place in the decision making process once the 
Commissioner decided to order testing.  Consequently, if the 
district court were to adjudicate this case as it is alleged in 
the complaint by plaintiffs, the court would not be "second-
guessing" a policy-based decision.  Instead, by measuring the 
technicians' conduct against the procedures they were to have 
followed and principles of good laboratory practice, it would be 
undertaking the sort of inquiry that courts are called on to make 
all the time. 
 Moreover, I do not find it significant that the conduct 
challenged here was embedded within the clearly discretionary 
consideration of whether to test incoming fruit or to remove all 
Chilean fruit from the market.  With respect to the decision to 
test fruit in the first place, I am guided by the body of law 
"holding that once the government makes a policy decision 
protected by the discretionary function exception, it must 
proceed with due care in the implementation of that decision."  
  
Caplan v. United States, 877 F.2d 1314, 1316 (6th Cir. 1989).  
This line of cases has grown out of the Supreme Court's decision 
in Indian Towing Co., Inc. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 76 S. 
Ct. 122, 100 L. Ed. 48 (1955), which concerned an action against 
the Coast Guard for negligent operation of a lighthouse.  The 
Court stated: 
   The Coast Guard need not undertake the lighthouse 
service.  But once it exercised its discretion to 
operate a light on Chandeleur Island and engendered 
reliance on the guidance afforded by the light, it was 
obligated to use due care to make certain that the 
light was kept in good working order; and, if the light 
did become extinguished, then the Coast Guard was 
further obligated to use due care to discover this fact 
and to repair the light or give warning that it was not 
functioning.  If the Coast Guard failed in its duty and 
damage was thereby caused to petitioners, the United 
States is liable under the Tort Claims Act. 
Id. at 69, 76 S. Ct. at 126-27.  In this case, once the FDA 
exercised its discretion to test incoming Chilean fruit, it 
incurred the obligation to use due care in doing so. 
 Nor am I led to a different result by the fact that the 
alleged negligence in the laboratory was followed by a decision 
that was, at the very least, a "but for" cause of the harm to 
plaintiffs.2  I am not persuaded by the majority's contention 
                     
2
. While I suspect that plaintiffs may encounter 
difficulty in attempting to prove that the alleged negligence of 
the lab technicians, rather than the Commissioner's decision, was 
the proximate cause of their injuries, I cannot allow that 
perception to color my analysis here.  Instead, I must accept the 
allegations in plaintiffs' complaints as true.  Those allegations 
  
that the possibility of liability will have an undesirable effect 
on policymakers who find themselves in a position analogous to 
that of the FDA Commissioner in this case.  Because there is an 
obligation to use due care in operating a lighthouse or licensing 
a polio vaccine or testing a grape for cyanide, decisions arising 
from the execution of that duty must be based upon the proper 
performance of that duty.  The desired result is that the purely 
technical aspects of any such decision will be properly 
(..continued) 
are directed at harm allegedly caused to plaintiffs by the 
negligent testing.  The district court may appropriately consider 
causation in subsequent stages of these proceedings, such as in 
deciding whether to grant a motion for summary judgment.  See 
Appley Brothers v. United States, 7 F.3d 720, 725 and n.2 (8th 
Cir. 1993) (Reversing district court's dismissal of suit, 
pursuant to discretionary function exception, on ground that 
plaintiffs based their claim on Department of Agriculture's 
negligent inspection of warehouse rather than on USDA's decision 
whether or not to revoke warehouse license; as to the issue of 
causation, the court of appeals held that the "question of 
whether appellants failed to state a cause of action was not 
before the district court, and is not an issue in this appeal.").  
I believe, however, that the factor of causation has no place in 
my consideration of whether the discretionary function exception 
applies to plaintiffs' allegations as they are presently 
expressed in the complaint. 
  
conducted.  If there is a chilling effect, as the majority fears 
there will be, the chill must be directed to ensure the non-
negligent operation of the lighthouse or the non-negligent 
licensing of the polio vaccine or the non-negligent examination 
of the grapes.  Just as the requirements for licensing a polio 
vaccine are discretionary but the steps to determine that a 
particular batch of vaccine is properly licensable are not 
discretionary, so too the removal from the market of cyanide-
contaminated grapes may be discretionary but the proper 
performance of established tests to detect the contamination is 
not. 
 In effect, I see no reason to believe that a finding of 
liability against the government in this case would have 
consequences of a different nature or to a greater extent than a 
finding of liability against the government in either Indian 
Towing or Berkovitz.  When an official makes a policy decision--
to build a lighthouse or to license a vaccine or to remove fruit 
from the market--the possibility of tort liability may factor 
into the analysis.  However, the focus of that consideration 
should be the ability of the government to perform the tasks 
which follow from the decision to implement the action.  If the 
government agency cannot reasonably expect to be able non-
negligently to operate a lighthouse or to license a vaccine or to 
test a grape for cyanide, this factor should be considered in 
instituting the line of action in the first place.  If testing 
grapes for cyanide were difficult or the results of such testing 
not reliable, the Commissioner might better exercise his 
  
discretion by withdrawing grapes from the market without having 
them tested.  However, once the decision was made to do the 
testing, the discretionary function exception should not protect 
the government from the consequences of the negligence of the 
laboratory technicians in performing their routine duties. 
 For the above reasons, I would reverse the dismissal of 
this case by the district court and would remand it for further 
proceedings. 
